We use two rounds of surveys, in 2000 and 2008, in the Zhili Township children's garment cluster in Zhejiang Province to examine in depth its evolution. Firm size has grown on average in terms of output and employment, and increasing divergence in firm sizes has been associated with a significant increase in specialization and outsourcing among firms in the cluster. Although initial investments have more than tripled, they remain low enough so that formal bank loans remain an insignificant source of finance. 
Introduction
China's rapid rural industrialization seems to defy the conventional wisdom that high transactions costs imply vertical integration. Its rapid industrialization has been accompanied by the emergence of numerous "specialty cities" of a particular kind.
Thousands of firms, large and small, many specialized in a finely defined production step, are agglomerated in a densely populated region, where some particular manufactured consumer good is churned out in millions (if not billions) annually. Many formerly rural towns in the coastal areas have become so specialized, boasting themselves as the world's Socks City, Sweater City, Kid's Clothing City, Footwear Capital, and so on. While these rapidly growing rural industries have been a major engine of China's unprecedented economic growth in the last two decades, their role in the development and growth process can be easily oversimplified. Moreover there are warning signs that these industries' role as a source of growth is reaching its limits. Competitive pressures at the global level, product market level, and on the labour market side are limiting output prices. At the same time, as China's growing prosperity is reflected in real wage increases, manufacturing costs are rising because productivity rises do not keep pace with rising labour costs. Despite numerous popular media reports on these phenomena (for example Deering, 2008; Lee, 2008) , few studies have rigorously investigated the mechanisms behind the emergence and evolution of these clusters.
The cluster-based rural industrialization described above not only plays a significant role in China's industrial growth but has also been important in the early stages of industrialization in other East Asian countries and many European countries (Hayami, 1998; World Bank, 2008) . Many clusters are initially formed as agglomerations of small and mediums-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Schmitz 1995; Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999) . Because most SMEs are generally labour intensive, the cluster-based rural industrialization model is conducive to generating nonfarm employment and fits well the comparative advantage of many developing countries, which are often marked with low capital-labour ratios and high population density (Hayami, 1998) . Therefore, it is important to study the mechanism of cluster formation in developing countries.
Most studies on the formation and evolution of clusters in developing countries are based on retrospective surveys and very few have tracked firm performance over a long period of time (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006) . In this paper, we make use of two rounds of surveys, in 2000 and 2008, in the Zhili Township children's garment cluster in Zhejiang Province to examine the evolution of market structure and productivity in depth.
ii Three decades ago, most people in this rural town were paddy farmers. Nowadays
Zhili township embodies one of the largest children garment production centers in China and the world. In the year 2006, a trade report stated that there were over 5000 children's garment manufacturers in Zhili Township (Wu, Yue, and Sim, 2007) . In this cluster, the production of garments has been divided into very fine phases. Many of the production tasks are undertaken by family workshops. Recently, because of high labour and land costs, some enterprises have begun to subcontract production to firms in neighboring Anhui Province. An in-depth case study on the evolution of this rural industrial cluster can help shed light on an important source of China's rapid industrialization and productivity growth over the past several decades as well as on its limitations.
We find that in the initial stage of cluster formation, because of lower capital and technology barriers to entry, competition in the product market was severe and formal education was not an important characteristic of owners/managers. China's initial industrialization path since economic reform in the late 1970s has been labour-intensive (Lin, Cai, and Li, 2003) . Recently, shortage of skilled labourers has become an increasingly frequent issue. In the later years covered in our surveys, we observe a drop in profit, which is driven not only by competition in the product market but also by rising labour costs. This pressure has induced firms to invest more in design, branding, ISO certification, and quality control so as to climb the value chain. An offsetting cost trend has been a tendency toward production specialization and outsourcing. We also find that TFP growth has been rather stagnant in the cluster over the past two decades. This suggests that reallocation of labour from the low-productivity agricultural sector to the more productive industrial sector has been a key driving force behind China's rapid industrialization, rather than TFP growth within labour-intensive sectors.
In the next section we describe basic features of the Zhili children's garment cluster; in section 3 we outline major aspects of the evolution of the Zhili cluster since 1990; section 4 draws conclusions and implications for China's economic growth and development.
A Brief History of Zhili Cluster
Zhili Township is located in northern Zhejiang Province, close to Taihu Lake, between Hangzhou and Shanghai. Historically, Zhili was an important silk and weaving production center. The name of Zhili stands for "weaving town" in Chinese. Population density has been very high in Zhili for hundreds of years. In the planned economic era, because of rather limited land, agricultural income was far from sufficient. As a result, many farmers produced pillow covers and bedding at home to generate side income, even though this activity was illegal at the time and was called the "tail of capitalism".
Although the local government tried in many ways to oppress these private industrial activities, Zhili's reputation as a bedding production center spread widely. After the central government adopted reform policies in the late 1970s, the local government reversed its opposition to private entrepreneurial activities. In the early 1980s, the local township government set up a bedding-product marketplace.
By the mid-1980s, the market for bedding products became saturated. Some Zhili merchants who were specialized in selling bedding products all over China conveyed back the market information that children's garments were in short supply. This information stimulated a few farmers to start producing children's clothes at home. Some family members were responsible for making clothes while others carried the clothes to various cities to sell them. Neighbors observed the success of the beginners and began to imitate them by producing children's garments in their homes, and by the late 1980s, more than ten villages in Zhili Township were specialized in children's garment production. The growing market facilitated the emergence of specialized merchants who purchased children's clothes produced in Zhili and sold them in rented counters in department stores all over China. Meanwhile, several wholesale marketplaces of children's garment were set up in the Zhili town center.
iii Since the 1990s, specialization has spread to the production process itself. Many farmers moved their production to the Zhili town center. They either bought or rented a three-story house combining the function of living, dining and working. The first floor usually was a store and sometimes for production as well, while production was often concentrated in the second floor. Workers slept in the third floor. Although the rent was much higher in the Zhili town center than in nearby villages, these costs were more than offset by agglomeration benefits, including those arising from better market information and reduced marketing costs and access to a centralized labour market. Another benefit arising from centralization of production arose from a signal of quality and reliability.
Having a storefront house sent a strong signal of credibility and quality to merchants who came from outside the local market area. By 1999, there were already about 1800 such "three-in-one" workshops. These stores mainly sold their own products, which were regarded being higher quality than those produced in dispersed farmers' houses in nearby villages.
The success of Zhili's business model attracted more merchants to order children's garments in either the wholesale markets or storefronts of the workshops. In 1999, the wholesale markets sold 75 million units with sales of 1.4 billion yuan. In 2000, to meet the rapidly increasing demand, the township government built the eighth wholesale marketplace. The products from nearby villages, which were generally of lower quality than those produced in the storefronts, were primarily sold in these wholesale markets. Fierce competition led to lower prices and profit margins in the wholesale markets, and many producers responded by relocating to the town center. Of course, the increasing demand for the preferred locations drove up housing prices, which approximately doubled between 1995 and 2000. Thus entry-level capital requirements were rising apace.
In addition to the rapid development of wholesale markets, related businesses, such as button and zipper production workshops, computer design studios, machinery sales and repairing stores, packaging and logistical services, also emerged. The town center was expanded from a narrow, 0.5 kilometer street to an area of four square kilometers, including two three-star hotels, over three dozen small hotels, and hundreds of restaurants. By 2005, Zhili had over 6000 enterprises engaged in children's garment production, employing over 200,000 workers and accounting for one-third of the national market. The local government also helped firms to adjust to the changing environment and to improve their ability to compete in domestic and international markets. Perhaps most important, a new quality inspection center was established to randomly check the quality of local products. Second, preferential treatments were given to firms that established respected brand names, including access to land at reduced prices. When firm size is measured in terms of value added or number of workers, the difference between the Zhili firms and those in Huzhou city is not as stark. The ratio of median value added of the Zhili firms to those in Huzhou is 82 per cent, and the comparable ratio for employment is 67 per cent.
Basic Features of the Industry
The median share of wages in value added is nearly the same in the Zhili, regional, and national samples. The data on capital stock in the Zhili sample includes only equipment and not real estate or plant structures. Therefore, a comparison of the capital:output ratios of the Zhili firms with the regional and national samples is not meaningful.
One of the most striking statistics in both surveys is the rapid turnover of firms.
Of the A major feature of these clustered enterprises is low entry barriers in terms of initial investment. As reported in Table 2 increasing by nearly 40 percent. The pressure on profits had important implications for the evolution of production methods and product quality, as we discuss below.
Evolution of the Industry
We discuss several measures of changes in industry structure and the complexity of manufacturing.
Specialization in production and outsourcing.
There is no information on outsourcing in the 2000 survey. 
Branding and quality
As discussed above, one of the most important issues facing this industry has been increasing competition creating increased pressure on profits and a tendency for firms to cut costs resulting in a self-defeating "race to the bottom" in terms of product quality and with negative implications for product and employee safety. Does Quality Pay? Evidence from Price Data. Industry efforts to avoid a "race to the bottom" in terms of product quality would fail if consumers were not willing to pay for the cost of producing better-quality merchandise. Measures of consumers' demand for quality can be obtained from estimates of hedonic price indexes for product characteristics. We specify hedonic indexes as follows:
where UP is the reported unit price of output for firm i at time t, where the X i are various characteristics of the items produced by the firms in our sample. These characteristics include the following:
• Expenditure on raw material per unit of output;
• Total annual expenditure on product design by the firm;
• A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has received ISO certification or has a registered a trademark; • Two variables representing the proportion of a firm's output declared to be "high quality" or of "medium quality" garments, respectively. These "quality" measures should be interpreted to reflect the type of market the respective items are intended to be sold. ("Low quality" is the omitted quality category.) • A variable representing the proportion of the firm's output produced for the "toddlers" market (versus "teens).
We take the estimated parameters β as equilibrium outcomes of firms' costs, their desire to place themselves in particular markets, and consumer preferences.
Estimation results for the hedonic index equations (1) and (2) are reported in table 5. The simplest formulation is shown in column (1). The estimated coefficients of raw materials, design expenditure, and the ISO or trademark dummy are all positive and significant. The coefficients imply that a one-yuan increase in raw material content of a garment is associated, cet. par. With a two percent increase in price per unit; that a 10,000 increase in total design expenditure per year is associated with a one-percent increase in price; and the presence of ISO certification or a trademark is associated with a 27 percent higher product price.
In column (2) of table 5, we see that when a dummy variable = 1 for data in a reporting year after 2000 is included in the hedonic regression, along with its interaction with the raw material variable, we observe the interesting result that the relative hedonic weight of raw material/unit is much higher in the year 2000 than in later years. This decline in the relative weight of raw materials is consistent with rising emphasis on product quality by producers and rising demand for quality by consumers over time.
Columns (3) and (4) report results for hedonic equations that include additional characteristic variables. Not surprisingly, high-and medium-quality production are both associated with significantly higher per unit prices and low-quality production, and "toddlers" garments are priced lower than "teens" garments, holding constant other product characteristics. When the design variable is interacted with the quality variables, the estimated coefficient of the design variable is much larger than in the regression that does not include these interaction terms, while the two interaction terms are both negative. While a negative interaction between declared quality and design expenditure may at first appear to be counterintuitive, we interpret this result to imply that "low quality" garments produced by firms that invest in product design are not perceived as undesirable by consumers. We specify both a value-added production function and a total-output production function in Cobb-Douglas form as follows.
Performance
and
where Y and Q are value added and total output, respectively, for firm i in year t; L and K are measures of labour and capital, respectively; the X n are intermediate inputs including raw materials, semi-manufactured garments, design costs, and so on; and ε and u are iid error terms. The evidence from our estimates of hedonic price indexes suggest that design and other expenditures on product characteristics are inputs that should be treated parallel to raw material and intermediate inputs in the production process. In one specification of the production function we also include a dummy variable for the year of observation to capture total factor productivity (TFP) changes over time. (ii) rising wages have cut into the profit rate of new firms more severely than into the profit rate for older firms, perhaps due to sluggish wage adjustments for employed workers; (iii) as noted in the introduction, in recent years, safety requirements have raised costs, and these requirements for safe workplaces may impinge more severely on new firms.
Profit per Unit of Invested Capital

Production function. Production function estimates are reported in table 6.
Estimation results for the value-added specification are reported in columns (1) through (3) and those for the total-output specifications in column (4) through (6). The simplest specifications are reported in columns (1) and (4). In both specifications, the estimated output elasticities sum to approximately unity, indicating approximate constant returns to scale. The estimated labour elasticities are about four times the magnitude of the estimated capital elasticities.
In the estimates reported in columns (2) and (5) Overall, TFP in the cluster appears to have grown at a respectable rate over the period following 2000. This TFP growth understates the contribution of the cluster to regional TFP growth, because a major source of China's outstanding economic growth in the reform era has been movement out of agriculture and from traditional to more technologically advanced industries (Zhang and Tan, 2007) . Because the labour productivity in the non-farm sector is higher than the agricultural sector, even if TFP in the non-farm sector maintains constant, a simple reallocation of labour from the agricultural sector will lead to overall economic growth.
viii
The production function estimation results are consistent those of the hedonic price index and support the hypothesis that output value is determined by characteristics associated with design and other measures of quality in addition to "pure" raw material.
Attempts to corroborate the production-function estimation results using firm fixed-effect regression yield very imprecise estimation results.
Summary
Our overview of the evolution of firms in the Zhili children's garment cluster We have used two measures of firm performance: profit per unit of invested capital, and total factor productivity. The ratio of profit to invested capital is substantially lower in 2007 than in 2000, at least for firms that have not been in continuous operation since at least 2000. However, TFP has tended to rise over time. We conjecture that the low profit ratio is attributable to some combination of rising wage costs, a more accurate measure of total investment, and to the stricter imposition of safety regulations.
Clustering within established communities where long-time relationships among family and neighbors prevail offers an institutional substitute for court enforcement of contractual relationships among borrowers and lenders and between outsourcing firms and their subcontractors. Local government has served a facilitating role in the innovation of institutional arrangements to prevent a destructive "race to the bottom" in terms of product quality and employee safety. The employment opportunities provided to workers with negligible productive opportunities in farming in Zhili and nearby locations have been a major contributor to rising aggregate TFP growth. However, rising wage costs imply that the supply of labour is not as highly elastic as in the past. The cluster's future growth will depend on higher rates of investment in both tangible and intangible capital (design costs, trademarking, copyrighting, etc.) Small investors will be increasingly consigned to operate as subcontractors for producers of brand-name clothing, and formal contract enforcement may become an issue. These changes likely require not only an upgrade of contractual formalities but also of courts' ability and willingness to enforce loan contracts and other contractual arrangements fairly and transparently. Hopefully, local and regional governments will respond to this need positively as they have to the need for quality and reputational certification. Such responses to existing institutional inadequacies can provide a critical stepping stone on the path to assure China's continuing growth and show the way to other developing nations. Li, Zhao (2008) . Deflator values are 1982-90, .689; 1991-95, 1.47; 1996 -2000 2001 1980-90, .65; 1996-99, 1.87 a. The dependent variable is the logarithm of average unit price of output reported by the firm; b. RM per unit is total expenditure on raw materials in yuan divided by the total number of units produced by the firm in a year. c. Design Expenditure is firm's total expenditure on design in a year in 10,000 yuan. d. ISO Cert or Trademark is a dummy variable for whether or not a firm has received ISO certification or has registered a trademark; e. High Quality is the proportion of firm's product lines that are self-identified as being high quality. Medium Quality is the proportion of firm's product lines that are self-identified as being medium quality. The omitted category is low quality. f. Toddler is the proportion of firm's product lines manufactured for toddlers. The omitted category is proportion manufactured for teens. g. Report Year after 2000 is a dummy variable for whether an observation was reported for the years 2005, 2006 Notes: a. The dependent variables are Value Added defined as value of output less value of raw materials measured in 1990 yuan and Output, which is total value of output in 1990 yuan. b. L is firm total employment in a given year. c. RM is the total value of raw materials purchased by the firm in yuan. d. Physical Capital is the sum of the firms reported investment flows and the value of the workplace in a given year. The depreciation rate applied is 10% per year. e. K is the sum of Physical Capital and the amount invested to achieve a trademark and ISO certification. The depreciation rate applied was 10% per year. f. Report Year After 2000 is a dummy variable for whether an observation was reported for the years 2005, 2006 or 2007 . The omitted category is observations reported for the year 2000. g. Design Expenditure is firm's total expenditure on design in a year in 10,000 yuan f. Certification is a dummy variable for whether or not the firm has ISO certification or a registered trademark.
g. Robust t values are in parentheses. h. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
Figures and Charts
Figure 1 Real Monthly Wages
Note: This chart shows average reported monthly wages in each year across both surveys. All values have been deflated to 1990 yuan using the GDP deflator and the implicit deflator derived from the real and nominal wage data in the Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook. 
Figure 4 Proportion of Firms with a Registered Trademark
Note: This chart shows the proportion of firms in each year reporting that they had successfully registered a trademark. 
Figure 5 Proportion of Firms with Submitted Trademark Applications
Note: This chart shows the proportion of firms in each year reporting that they had submitted an application for a trademark. 
Figure 7 Proportion of Firms with Submitted ISO Certification Applications
Note: This chart shows the proportion of firms in each year reporting that they had submitted an application for ISO certification. Expenditures were deflated back to 1990 yuan using the GDP deflator. Note: Profit in figure 9a is calculated as (Total Revenue -Total Cost -Compensation to the Entrepreneur). We assume the entrepreneur was compensated at 1.5x the annual salary paid to the average worker he employed. The values on the vertical axis have been indexed to set profit in the year 2000 as the base year =100. All prices and wages were deflated to 1990 using the GDP deflator for Zhejiang. Zhang and Tan (2007) , reallocating even 1 percent of the agricultural labour force could increase national GDP by 0.9 percent.
